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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
This case raises unique issues which depend heavily on the specific language of a previous

TEDRA settlement agreement and that language's relation to the TEDRA statutes. This case
involves the methods available for a party to enforce a TEDRA agreement, whether the parties
effectively waived certain avenues for relief by contract, and whether the parties ultimately
pursued avenues for relief that were available. This issue appears to be of first impression for the
Idaho Supreme Court. 1

B.

PROCEDURALmACTUALBACKGROUND:
The facts relevant to this appeal appear to be largely undisputed. Clifton G. Frizzell and

Marjorie J. Frizzell created the Clifton and Marjorie Frizzell Family Trust ("Trust") on June 30,
2009, which included a Bypass Trust, a Survivor's Trust, and a QTIP Trust. R. 7. Clifton and
Marjorie were the grantors and original trustees. R. 7. Both Clifton and Marjorie died in 2011.
R. 7. The Trust names Haley Baker as successor trustee, but Ms. Baker declined the appointment,
and Edwin De Young (Trustee/Defendant/Respondent) was appointed as the successor trustee on
October 29, 2011. R. 7.
Donald Frizzell (Beneficiary/Plaintiff/Appellant) filed a lawsuit regarding the Trust in
2013. R. 159. The suit was resolved when the parties entered into a Trust and Estate Dispute
Resolution Act (TEDRA) Agreement, which was filed in district court on October 31, 2014. R.

159.

The TEDRA Agreement contains a release and hold harmless clause as well as a clause

Trustee De Young ~cknowledges the potential to create confusing and/or unintended precedent
in this case, especially given the lack of appellate decisions related to TEDRA combined with the
peculiar facts of this case. As such, any decision might be most appropriately limited to the unique
facts of this case.
1

1

purporting to indemnify Trustee De Young against any claims, lawsuits, or other actions relating
to the administration of the Trust. See R. 74-82.
Beneficiary Frizzell then filed the Complaint in this case on October 6, 2016, alleging
thirteen causes of action regarding the administration of the Trust: 1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty of
Loyalty for failing to provide information, 2) Breach of Fiduciary Duty to Distribute Assets, 3)
Breach of Fiduciary Duty for directly competing with Plaintiff, 4) Breach of Fiduciary Duty based
on negligent supervision of the Trust, 5) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to make Trust
property productive, 6) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to protect Trust property (security
deposits), 7) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to protect Trust property (Brayton property), 8)
Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failure to provide information, 9) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for
engaging in self-dealing, 10) Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to remain impartial, 11) Breach
of the duty of Loyalty for failure to file insurance claims, 12) Claim for Punitive Damages, and
13) Claim for Damages for Lost Income. See R. 6-35.
Trustee De Young responded by filing a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted and requesting attorney fees. R. 160. The basis for the Motion was
that Beneficiary Frizzell's claims were barred by the TEDRA Agreement, which had resolved
similar claims from the previous lawsuit. R. 160.
The District Court granted Trustee DeYoung's motion, dismissed the case, and granted
attorney fees to Trustee DeYoung via the Memorandum Decision and Order filed January 20,
2017. R. 158. Beneficiary Frizzell then timely filed the present appeal of the District Court's
decision. See. R. 177-206.

2

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the District Court err in granting Trustee DeYoung's Motion to Dismiss where
Beneficiary Frizzell failed to pursue enforcement remedies pursuant to TEDRA and instead
asserted claims which had already been released via the TEDRA Agreement?
2. Is DeYoung entitled to attorney fees for successfully defending this action, both in District
Court and on appeal?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim must be read in
conjunction with Rule 8(a), which sets forth the requirements for pleading a claim and calls for 'a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a demand
for relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992). A court
may only consider matters within the pleadings as part of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hellickson v.
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). A complaint should be dismissed

under Rule 12(b) when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts which
would entitle them to relief." See, e.g., Dumas v. Ropp, 98 Idaho 61, 62,558 P.2d 632,633 (1977).
"The non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed in
his/her favor, and only then may the question be asked whether a claim for relief has been stated."
Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,578, 850 P.2d 724, 729 (1993).

A court's dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is reviewed de nova. Coalition for
Agriculture's Future v. Canyon County, 160 Idaho 142, 369 P.3d 920, 923 (2016). If the record

reveals that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of
law, the granting of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be affirmed. See Moss v. Mid-American Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,302,647 P.2d 754, 758 (1982).
3

Additionally, TEDRA gives courts "full and ample power and authority to ... administer
and settle" trust and estate matters.

LC. § 15-8-102(1 ).

Furthermore, even if TEDRA is

inapplicable, insufficient, or doubtful with reference to the administration and settlement of trust
and estate matters, courts still have "full power and authority to proceed with such administration
and settlement in any manner and way that to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that
the matters be expeditiously administered and settled by the court. LC. § 15-8-102(2). These
provisions must be read so as to respect TEDRA's purpose "to set forth generally applicable
statutory provisions for the resolution of disputes and other matters involving trusts and estates in
a single chapter." LC.§ 15-8-101(2).
As such, the District Court has the power and discretion to proceed with administration of
trust disputes in any manner that to the court seems right and proper, with the goal being to resolve
such disputes as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, although review of an LR.C.P 12(b)(6)
motion is clearly de novo, this Court should also recognize the District Court's broad discretion in
determining the proper method for administering trust disputes, and apply an abuse of discretion
standard to the court's decisions regarding the appropriate procedure for resolving trust disputes
in this case.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TEDRA STATUTES PROVIDE A METHOD FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
TEDRA AGREEMENTS.
As already briefly mentioned above, TEDRA's purpose
is to set forth generally applicable statutory provisions for the resolution of
disputes and other matters involving trusts and estates in a single chapter
under title 15, Idaho Code. The provisions of this chapter are intended to
provide nonjudicial methods for the resolution of matters by agreement.
This chapter also provides for judicial resolution of disputes if a nonjudicial
resolution is not obtained that are alternatives to the other provisions for
resolution of contested matters under other chapters of title 15, Idaho Code.
4

J.C. § 15-8-101(2).
In order to facilitate its goals, TEDRA provides courts with "full and ample power and
authority ... to administer and settle" trust and estate matters. LC. § 15-8-102(1). Moreover, in
circumstances where TEDRA is inapplicable, insufficient, or doubtful with reference to the
administration and settlement of trust and estate matters, "the court nevertheless has full power
and authority to proceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and way that to
the court seems right and proper, all to the end that the matters be expeditiously administered and
settled by the court." J.C. § 15-8-102(2). "Matter" is defined broadly to include essentially any
issue, dispute, or question regarding distribution, administration, or management of a trust or
estate. LC. § 15-8-103(1).
While Beneficiary Frizzell apparently contends that TEDRA does not provide a process
for enforcement of the instant TEDRA Agreement (Appellant's Brief p. 15), LC. § 15-8-201(1)
clearly states:
Any party may have a judicial proceeding for the declaration of rights and or legal
relations with respect to:
(a) Any matter, as defined in section 15-8-103, Idaho Code;
(b) The resolution of any other case or controversy that arises under the Idaho Code
and referenced judicial proceedings under this chapter; or ...
Any party to a trust matter or dispute can petition the court for a declaration of rights and
or legal relations pursuant to TEDRA. LC. § 15-8-201(1). As the district court recognized, "it is
clear from a reading of the statutes that a TEDRA agreement is binding on the parties to such an
agreement and a party seeking to enforce a provision of a TEDRA agreement may do so in the
same manner as one would petition a court to enforce a court order. See Idaho Code§§ 15-8-30103." R. 163. "On filing the agreement or memorandum, the agreement will be deemed approved

5

by the court and is equivalent to a final court order binding on all persons interested in the estate
or trust." J.C. § 15-8-303 (emphasis added).
The instant TEDRA Agreement was undisputedly filed in District Court on October 31,
2014. R. 8.

As such, Beneficiary Frizzell could have sought enforcement of the TEDRA

Agreement in the same way as any other final court order, but instead chose to file a new suit
alleging claims he'd already released.
To suggest that a TEDRA judicial proceeding would lack the teeth to enforce any such
declaration completely ignores the more general judicial power to enforce court orders. For
example, J.C. § 7-302 allows a district court to issue a writ of mandate "to compel the performance
of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station." See
also LC. § 7-401 et. seq. (Writs of Prohibition). Furthermore, courts are provided with contempt

powers to ensure that the orders they issue are actually followed. See, e.g., LC. § 7-601 et. seq.;
Idaho Const. Art. V, § 2; Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560,566,671 P.2d 473,479 (1983).
For the sake of argument only, if Beneficiary Frizzell's allegations were true, Beneficiary
Frizzell had an avenue for relief by petitioning the District Court to determine the effect of and
enforce the terms of the TEDRA Agreement. Instead, Beneficiary Frizzell filed a lawsuit that
didn't cite TEDRA as its avenue for relief and asserted new claims that had already been released.
The District Court thus properly granted Trustee De Young's LR.C.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.
B.

THE TEDRA AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE UNAMBIGUOUSLY RELEASES
TRUSTEE DEYOUNG FROM FUTURE LIABILITY RELATED TO
ADMINISTRATION OF THE TRUST AND SUBMITS FUTURE DISPUTES TO
THE TEDRA STATUTORY SCHEME.

A court construes a trust instrument, a TEDRA agreement, and all other contracts as a
whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See Salfeety v. Seideman (In re Estate
of Kirk), 127 Idaho 817, 827, 907 P.2d 794 (1995). The court's primary objective is to discover
6

the intent of the parties through viewing the document in its entirety. See Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho
993, 996, 829 P .2d 1342 (1992). When a document is clear and unambiguous, interpretation of its
meaning is a question of law. See id
"The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court
as a question oflaw." Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854,858,673 P.2d 1048 (1983). "If, however,
the instrument of conveyance is ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for
the trier of fact." Id When a court is called upon to interpret contractual language,
A party's subjective, undisclosed intent is immaterial to the interpretation of a
contract, as under the objective law of contract interpretation, the court will give
force and effect to the words of the contract without regard to what the parties to
the contract though it meant or what they actually intended for it to mean. The
court will not attempt to ascertain the actual mental processes of the parties in
entering into the particular contract; rather the law presumes that the parties
understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention which its
terms manifest.
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748 (2006).
Similarly, when interpreting a trust instrument, a court must construe the instrument as a
whole, considering all parts in light of the entire instrument. See In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho
817,907 P.2d 794, 804 (1994). The court's primary objective is to discover the intent of the parties
through viewing a document in its entirety. See Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993,996,829 P.2d 1342
(1992). When a document is clear and unambiguous, interpretation of its meaning is a question of
law. See id In determining whether a document is ambiguous, the court seeks to determine
whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Id at 997.

1.

ALL PARTIES UNDERSTOOD AND SIGNED THE TEDRA
AGREEMENT WHILE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

-All parties undisputedly signed the TEDRA Agreement. See R. 107-117. The TEDRA
Agreement itself states it is entered into pursuant to LC. § 15-8-101 through 15-8-305, and that

7

"The issues addressed in this Agreement are the types of issues or matters contemplated to be
resolved pursuant to LC. 15-8-103." R. 100.

All parties to the Agreement understood and

accepted the terms of the Agreement and "had the opportunity to consult with his or her own
attorney." R. 105. The TEDRA Agreement clearly and unambiguously bars Beneficiary Frizzell's
claims.

2.

PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT

Paragraph 2 of the TEDRA Agreement states:
Nature of this Agreement. This Agreement is intended to be a binding agreement
to resolve certain issues that have arisen or could arise in the future between the
Parties in a manner that will avoid the necessity of further litigation or court
proceedings in this matter to resolve such issues and further will serve as written
documentation to third Parties of the Parties' Agreement.

R. 100 (emphasis added).

As the District Court noted, the intent of all parties to the TEDRA Agreement was to
resolve certain issues both that had already arisen and that "could arise in the future between the
Parties." R. 100, 166. The plain reading of paragraph 2 clearly states that the TEDRA Agreement
was not merely a resolution of those issues contested at the time, but also future issues that "could
arise in the future" related to the administration of the Trust.
If the parties intended that only past disputes be resolved pursuant to the Agreement, then

the language regarding issues that "could arise in the future" would be unnecessary. The statement
is unambiguous and demonstrates that the TEDRA Agreement contemplated and intended to
proactively resolve disputes that "could arise in the future" related to the administration of the
Trust.

3.

PARAGRAPH 5.5 OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT

Paragraph 5.5 of the TEDRA Agreement reads:

8

Management of the real properties to be distributed to DON pursuant to Section 5.2
above shall be delegated to DON effective October 1, 2014. DON shall indemnify,
defend, and hold harmless ED as Trustee against any claims, lawsuits or other
actions, including all costs of attorney fees incurred in defense of such claims,
lawsuits or other actions, arising as a result of DON'S management of the real
properties described in Section 5. 3 above. During such management and before
distribution of the properties to DON, DON is prohibited from terminating and
unreasonably interfering with the existing manager of the real property at 39th St.
in Phoenix, Arizona.

R. 103 (emphasis added).
The section 5.3 real property was to remain in the Trust until it was distributed to
Beneficiary Frizzell at a later date. See R. 103. In Paragraph 5.5, Beneficiary Frizzell specifically
holds Trustee DeYoung harmless for any actions taken by Beneficiary Frizzell after the execution
of the TEDRA Agreement, clearly contemplating that the distribution of Trust assets had not yet
taken place as of the date of the execution of the TEDRA Agreement. In paragraph 5.5, both
Beneficiary Frizzell and Trustee DeYoung clearly intended to and did waive certain rights pursuant
to actions that might or might not occur in the future. As such, the District Court correctly
concluded that the plain language of paragraph 5.5 is clear and unambiguous and that such
language demonstrated an agreement by the parties to indemnify and hold Trustee DeYoung
harmless for future claims arising out of Trustee DeYoung's administration of the Trust.
4.

PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT

Paragraph 6 of the TEDRA Agreement provides:
Donald C. Frizzell's Indemnification of Edwin J. DeYoung. DON, on behalf of
himself and as custodian for CRAIG J. FRIZZELL and DEAN J. FRIZZELL
agrees to indemnify, defend and hold ED harmless against any claims, lawsuits, or
other actions, including all costs and attorney fees incurred in defense of such
claims, lawsuits or other actions, advanced against ED by DON or DON'S children
or heirs relating to ED 's administration of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust,
Bypass Trust and QTIP Trust.
R. 104.

9

The plain language of paragraph 6 is unambiguous. Beneficiary Frizzell intended to
indemnify, defend, and hold Trustee De Young harmless against any and all "claims lawsuits or
other actions ... relating to [Trustee DeYoung's] administration of the [Trust]." Again, the
TEDRA Agreement clearly shows that at the time of execution there were still assets to be
distributed from the Trust and Trustee DeYoung was still acting as the Trust Administrator. See,
e.g., R. I 03. Paragraph 6 clearly encompasses and holds Trustee De Young harmless for any claims

that could be levelled against Trustee De Young in his capacity as Trust Administrator. While
Beneficiary Frizzell may now regret such language, it is the black letter law of contracts that a
party to a contract is presumed to have read, understood, and agreed to the provisions therein. J.R.
Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614 (2006).

5.

PARAGRAPH 9 OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT

Paragraph 9 of the TEDRA Agreement begins in relevant part:
Release and Hold Harmless. The Beneficiaries, on behalf of themselves, their
heirs and successors-in-interest (including unborn and unascertained descendants),
their agents and assigns (hereinafter collectively referred to in this Section as the
"Releasors") release, discharge, and indemnify ED, and ED'S heirs, successors-ininterest, agents, and assigns (hereinafter collectively referred to in this paragraph
as the "Releasees"), from any and all actual or potential claims or causes of action,
of whatsoever kind or nature, whether at law or in equity, whether known or
unknown, accrued or yet to arise or accrue, including but not limited to any claims
of negligence or breach offiduciary duty or breach of contract, which relate to or
arise out of any act, omission or conduct of ED in his capacity as Trustee that the
Releasors now have, ever had, may have had, or may thereafter have from the
inception of the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, By pass Trust and the QTIP Trust
up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such release is limited to claims that
were asserted or that could have been asserted by the Releasors against the
Releasees arising out of or related in any way to the administration of the Family
Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and the QTIP Trust, the distribution of the
trust property held in the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust and the QTIP
Trust, and all liability relating to the Family Trust, Survivor's Trust, Bypass Trust
and the QTIP Trust that might arise between the Releasors and the Releasees now
or in the future.

10

R. 105 (emphasis added).

Beneficiary Frizzell contends that Paragraph 9 limits the Beneficiaries' release to claims
that arose "from the inception of the [Trust] up to the date this Agreement is executed." However,
Beneficiary Frizzell neglects to consider the remaining language of Paragraph 9 which clearly
pertains to and releases future claims. As properly interpreted by the District Court, paragraph 9
can be summed up as follows:
1. [Trustee] is released from all liability from the inception of the Trust until the
execution of the TEDRA Agreement based on the following:
[Beneficiaries release Trustee] from any and all actual or potential claims
or causes of action, of whatsoever kind or nature, whether at law or in
equity, whether known or unknown, accrued or yet to arise or accrue,
including but not limited to any claims of negligence or breach of fiduciary
duty or breach of contract, which relate to or arise out of any act, omission
or conduct of ED in his capacity as Trustee that the Releasors now have,
ever had, may have had, or may thereafter have from the inception of the
[Trust] up to the date this Agreement is executed. Such release is limited to
claims that were asserted or that could have been asserted by the Releasors
against the Releasees arising out of or related in any way to the
administration of the [Trust], the distribution of the trust property held in
the [Trust] ...
2. [Trustee] is released from all liability from the point of the execution of the
TEDRA Agreement until he is no longer serving as the Trust Administrator
based on the following:
and all liability relating to the [Trust] that might arise between the Releasors
and the Releasees now or in the future.
R. 170 (emphasis in original, alterations added/or clarification/simplicityt As the District Court

explained, "The plain meaning provides that: in addition to a release for all prior claims related to
Defendant's administration of the Trust, all future claims that might arise between Plaintiff and
Defendant are encompassed by the release." R. 171.
First, the paragraph releases claims that could have been asserted from the inception of the
Trust until the execution of the TEDRA Agreement. Next, the Beneficiaries release Trustee
11

De Young from liability for claims related to Trustee De Young's administration of the Trust that
might arise now or in the future. The plain language is clear and unambiguous. The release
includes future actions related to the administration of the Trust. This reading is appropriate and
is supported when considering Paragraph 9 in light of the entire Agreement.
6.

PARAGRAGH 7 OF THE TEDRA AGREEMENT

Paragraph 7 contains the statement:
All Parties to this Agreement understand and acknowledge that if this Agreement
is filed with the court then its terms will become final and binding and the
equivalent of a final court order binding on all of the Parties who have signed the
same pursuant to J.C. § 15-8-303 .... Furthermore, the Beneficiaries specifically
agree that this Agreement shall be fully binding upon them even if it may be
determined later that this Agreement is not an Agreement under LC. § 15-8-303
and/or that any necessary Party for such an Agreement was omitted or not virtually
represented.
R. 104. As a party to the TEDRA Agreement, Beneficiary Frizzell is bound by its terms regardless

of what his own subjective intent might have been. See, e.g., Justadv. Ward, 147 Idaho 509,512,
211 P.3d 118 (2009) (quoting 17AAm. Jur. 2d. Contracts§ 91 (2ded. 2008)).
Especially when examined as a whole, The TEDRA Agreement in this case clearly and
unambiguously releases Trustee De Young from future liability related to administration of the
Trust and submits future disputes to the TEDRA statutory scheme for enforcement.
C.

INSTEAD OF SEEKING A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE
APPROPRIATE AND AGREED TEDRA PROCEDURES AND STATUTORY
SCHEME, BENEFICIARY FRIZZELL PURSUED NEW CLAIMS FOR BREACH
OF FIDUCIARY DUTY EVEN THOUGH BENEFICIARY FRIZZELL HAD
ALREADY RELEASED SUCH CLAIMS.
Beneficiary Frizzell now contends that the clear and unambiguous terms to which he agreed

should be void as against public policy because a contract cannot waive someone's day in court.
Beneficiary Frizzell appears to misconstrue the District Court's decision, claiming that "[t]he
District Court asserted that the TEDRA Agreement waived Frizzell's right to ever seek
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enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement or the underlying Trust that it modified." Appellant's
Brief, p. 25. Trustee DeYoung acknowledges that it would be nonsensical for a court to recognize

the TEDRA Agreement as binding while simultaneously finding that its own terms prevent
enforcement. That is not the case here. To the contrary, as the District Court explained,
[Beneficiary Frizzell] did not waive his day in court, rather, [Beneficiary Frizzell]
agreed to non-judicial dispute resolution regarding matters related to the
administration of the Trust. Further, [Beneficiary Frizzell] had every opportunity
to seek enforcement of the TEDRA Agreement through the plenary power of the
court to resolve disputes related to the Agreement. That cannot be considered a
waiver of [Beneficiary Frizzell's] day in court. The policy behind the Act is to
promote non-judicial resolution of trust disputes, efficiency in trust administration,
and judicial resolution ofdisputes where non-judicial efforts fail. Idaho Code § 158-101. The TEDRA Agreement is not a waiver of Plaintiff's day in court.
As this Court noted above, [Beneficiary Frizzell] had a vehicle to assert his rights
under the TEDRA Agreement and the administration of the Trust. [Beneficiary
Frizzell] could have filed a petition with the Court to execute the terms of the
TEDRA Agreement. See Idaho Code§ 15-8-101 et. seq. [Beneficiary Frizzell] did
not waive his rights, rather [Beneficiary Frizzell] contracted to have his rights
administered pursuant to the TEDRA statutes. That is something different than an
absolute waiver of a right to assert a claim in court. [Beneficiary Frizzell] slept on
his right to bring his claims under the TEDRA statute and here is attempting to
circumvent the Agreement and continue litigating issues related to [Trustee
De Young's] administration of the Trust. This is precisely the action that TEDRA
was designed to avoid. The provisions of the TEDRA [Agreement] holding
[Trustee De Young] harmless from actions taken as the Trust administrator speak
clearly, directly, and release [Trustee DeYoung] from all liability related to the
administration of the Trust.

R. 172-173 (italicized emphasis in original, bold emphasis added, alterations added for
clarification). A party may contract to release themselves from "certain duties and liabilities under

a contract subject to certain limitations." Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho
175, 595 P.2d 709, 712 (1979). "Clauses which exclude liability must speak clearly and directly
to the particular conduct of the defendant which caused the harm at issue." Id.
As explained above, the TEDRA Agreement, especially when considered as a whole,
clearly and unambiguously releases future claims against Trustee De Young related to Trustee
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DeYoung's administration of the Trust. Additionally, the TEDRA Agreement itself states the
statutory basis for the agreement and further provides that "[t]he issues addressed in this agreement
are the types of issues or matters contemplated to be resolved pursuant to LC. § 15-8-103." R.
100. Beneficiary Frizzell did not waive his right to enforcement and relief; he agreed to seek

enforcement and relief via TEDRA if necessary.
Beneficiary Frizzell cites Rawlings v. Layne Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 500, 465
P.2d 107, 111 (1970) for the proposition that "[w]hile a party may bargain for exemption from
liability for negligence, a bargain from liability for the consequences of a willful breach of duty is
illegal." Appellant's Brief, p. 26. However, as that Court more fully explained,
Appellant contends that it is against public policy to allow a person to contract away
his legal rights and remedies for future negligence. This rule is not absolute, and
in the opinion of this Court is more realistically viewed as an exception rather than
the general rule which prevails throughout the majority of American jurisdictions.
Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts and
is an essential element of the free enterprise system.
Rawlings, 93 Idaho at 500. Beneficiary Frizzell freely contracted away his right to bring future

separate claims against Trustee DeYoung related to the administration of the Trust. This did not
waive his day in court or render the TEDRA Agreement unenforceable. Beneficiary Frizzell still
could have sought to enforce the terms of the Agreement under the TEDRA scheme. He chose not
to.
In what appears to be one of the few Idaho appellate decisions to mention TEDRA, the
Court recognized that the Plaintiff"filed a verified Petition, invoking the Trust and Estate Dispute
Resolution Act (TEDRA), LC. §§ 15-8-101 to 305." Quemada v. Arizmendez (In re Estate of
Ortega), 153 Idaho 609, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012). Moreover, in considering attorney fees, the

Court found it significant that the plaintiff "did invoke TEDRA in her initial Petition and in her
superseding Amended Petition," and further, that the plaintiff"stated she was petitioning the court
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'pursuant to TEDRA, LC. 15-8-101 et. seq."' Id. at 834. Because it was "clear that [the Plaintiff]
asserted in her Amended Petition that TEDRA was her basis for seeking relief," the Court applied
TEDRA's attorney fee provision. Id. (alteration added for clarification).
Additionally, in another case cited by Beneficiary Frizzell, In re Guardianship of Wells,
150 Wash. App. 491,208 P.3d 1126 (2009), the court again recognized and found significant that
the initial petition had clearly invoked TEDRA and its broad powers. Id. at 1129, 1131. As
Beneficiary Frizzell acknowledges, the Wells "lower court sua sponte invoked its inherent powers
to order contempt for breach of the settlement agreement." Appellant's Brief, 19. Beneficiary
Frizzell then apparently concludes that the District Court in this case had a duty to do the same.
However, in Wells, the Petitioner clearly invoked TEDRA as the basis for relief, which was
significant in that case because of TEDRA's "broad and exclusive" jurisdictional powers. In re

Guardianship of Wells, 150 Wash. App. 491, 208 P.3d 1126, 1131 (2009). Conversely, in this
case, Beneficiary Frizzell did not invoke TEDRA in his initial Petition and instead sought damages
for breach of fiduciary duty. See R. 6-35.

If Beneficiary Frizzell would have invoked and

petitioned pursuant to TEDRA, as was the case in Wells, then the District Court could have invoked
its contempt powers to enforce the TEDRA Agreement. Instead, Beneficiary Frizzell asserted
claims he had already released and now argues that the District Court erred, essentially by not
converting his Complaint into a TEDRA Petition sua sponte. Beneficiary Frizzell has provided
no authority to support any duty, or even the pow:er, of the District Court to make such a
conversion.
As explained above, Wells is obviously distinguishable due to the key fact that the Petition
in Wells invoked TEDRA and its broad powers. Moreover, simply because the Court in that case
raised contempt as an avenue for enforcement sua sponte, (again, when the Petition invoked
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TEDRA) does not support the contention that the District Court in this case had any duty to raise
contempt as a means of enforcement where Beneficiary Frizzell failed to petition pursuant to or
invoke TEDRA as a means of relief in any way.
Beneficiary Frizzell's Complaint alleges multiple breaches of fiduciary duty, punitive
damages, and a claim for lost income as causes of action. See R. 6-35. While it necessarily
mentions the TEDRA Agreement, the Complaint never mentions the TEDRA statutes or suggests
that it is a petition pursuant to TEDRA. See R. 6-35.

As such, Quemada and Wells support the

District Court's reasoning that Beneficiary Frizzell could have petitioned pursuant to TEDRA, but
failed to do so, instead asserting different claims that had already been released by the TEDRA
Agreement.
The TEDRA Agreement did not waive Beneficiary Frizzell's day in court, and its terms
are not void as against public policy. Beneficiary Frizzell agreed to a set of non-judicial and
judicial dispute resolution procedures pursuant to the TEDRA statutes but then attempted to sue
Trustee DeYoung for claims Beneficiary Frizzell had already released. The District Court properly
dismissed Beneficiary Frizzell's claims.

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE THE DUTY TO CONVERT
BENEFICIARY FRIZZELL'S CAUSES OF ACTION INTO A TEDRA CAUSE OF
ACTION.
Beneficiary Frizzell argues that the District Court erred by not permitting Frizzell to amend

his Complaint, complaining that the district was too "harsh" on Frizzell. Appellant's Brief, 17.
This argument must fail as Beneficiary Frizzell never moved or otherwise requested to amend his
Complaint. See R. 1-212.
Additionally, Beneficiary Frizzell appears to contend that the District Court had a duty to
functionally convert Beneficiary Frizzell' s breach of fiduciary duty causes of action into a TEDRA
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enforcement proceeding. See Appellant's Brief 16-20. However, it was Beneficiary Frizzell's
responsibility, as the Plaintiff, to place the Defendant on notice of the claims brought against him.
A sufficient complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). "Under notice pleading, 'a party is no longer
slavishly bound to stating particular theories in its pleadings."' Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. N
Pac. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241,246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2008) (quoting Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135

Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 864 (2000)). A complaint must merely state claims upon which relief
may be granted, and pleadings should be liberally construed in the interest of securing "a just,
speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case." Id. The technical rules of pleading have long been
abandoned in Idaho, and the "general policy behind the current rules of civil procedure is to
provide every litigant with his or her day in court." Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d
993, 995 (1986). "Though this Court will make every intendment to sustain a complaint that is
defective, e.g., wrongly captioned or inartful, a complaint cannot be sustained if it fails to make a
short and plain statement of a claim upon which relief may be granted." Gibson v. Ada County
Sheriffs Dep't, 139 Idaho 5, 9, 72 P.3d 845, 849 (2003). "The key issue in determining the validity

of a complaint is whether the adverse party is put on notice of the claims brought against
it." Id. "A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal." Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141
Idaho 604, 613, 114 P.3d 974, 983 (2005).
The notice pleading issue in this case is very similar to that in Brown v. City of Pocatello,
148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164 (2010). In Brown, the only theory of recovery identified in the
Complaint was negligence. Id. at 1171. The Plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment,
claiming that the Defendant's actions constituted a nuisance and an uncompensated taking of
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property. Id. at 1167. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for nuisance and inverse
condemnation, finding that these claims were raised for the first time at summary judgment
proceedings. Id The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, reasoning
Although a complaint need not identify the statutory basis for relief nor include a
formal statement of the cause of action being pursued, there must
be some indication of the theory of recovery supporting the relief sought-a naked
recitation of the facts alone is insufficient. Without a clear and concise statement
sufficient to place a reasonable attorney on notice of the plaintiffs theories of
recovery that must be defended against, whether in the body of the complaint or in
the prayer for relief, it cannot be said that a cause of action was sufficiently pled.
Even under the liberal notice pleading standard, a complaint must reasonably imply
the theory upon which relief is being sought. See Dewey v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No.
10, 95 Wash. App. 18, 974 P.2d 847, 851 (1999).

Id. at 1170 (emphasis in original). After analyzing the Plaintiff's Complaint in Brown, the Court
continued eloquently,
Here, Brown's Complaint is not separated into multiple causes of action, and the
only theory of recovery identified is negligence. Brown's Complaint uses the words
"negligent," "negligently," and "negligence" but makes no mention of a nuisance
or taking, either specifically or through the use of operative terms typically
associated with these claims. Read as a whole, the allegations contained in Brown's
Complaint are consistent with what is expected where a cause of action for
negligence is being alleged. The prayer for relief is a generic request for damages,
not inconsistent with what might properly be requested where the sole theory of
recovery is negligence. Our liberal notice pleading standard is intended to see
justice done, and prevent the dismissal of a valid claim for a mere technical failing.
However, the opposing party must be provided with notice of the underlying
theories being pursued against them in order to adequately prepare for trial. Our
notice pleading standard requires more than a naked recitation of facts from which
a hyper-vigilant attorney could possibly foresee the possibility of a given cause of
action. A plaintiff cannot, in his complaint, paint us a picture of a four-legged
animal with fur and a tail labeled "cat" and then assert at summary judgment that
the picture depicts a dog.

Id. at 1171-1172.
In this case, Beneficiary Frizzell asserted claims for damages based on causes of action for
breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and lost income in his Complaint. See R. 6-35. After
realizing that he had already released such claims by way of the TEDRA Agreement, Beneficiary
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Frizzell now contends for the first time on appeal that his Complaint should be read as an action
under TEDRA to enforce the TEDRA Agreement. Beneficiary Frizzell simply failed to place
Trustee DeYoung on notice of any claim under TEDRA, so the District Court properly dismissed
the claim.
Beneficiary Frizzell contends that he should be permitted to amend his Complaint because
"a district court should grant leave to amend 'even if no request to amend the pleading was made,
unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts."'

Appellant's Brief, 17 (quoting Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern California Collection
Service, Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added)). The Complaint was not
dismissed because of deficiencies in/actual allegations; it was dismissed because the Complaint
asserted claims that had already been released and because the Complaint failed to place Trustee
De Young on notice of any valid theories to be defended against upon which relief could be
granted. Therefore, the District Court properly granted Trustee De Young's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

E.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Trustee De Young requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. § 15-8-208 and pursuant

to the TEDRA Agreement itself. This Court should also affirm the District Court's award of
attorney fees to Trustee De Young. LC.§ 15-8-208 provides,
(1) Either the District Court or the Court on appeal may, in its discretion, order
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to be awarded to any party:
(a) From any party to the proceedings;
(b) From the assets of the estate or trust involved in the proceedings; or
(c) From any nonprobate asset that is the subject of the proceedings. The
court niay order the costs to be paid in such amount and in such manner as
the court determines to be equitable.
(2) This section applies to all proceedings governed by this chapter including, but
not limited to, proceedings involving trusts, decedent's estates and properties, and
guardianship matters.
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Additionally, "[c]ontractual terms providing for recovery of attorney fees incurred in
actions to enforce the contract represent an election by the parties to place the risk of litigation
costs on the one who is ultimately unsuccessful. Such provisions are ordinarily to be honored by
the courts." Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 210 P.3d 552, 560 (2009) (quoting Holmes v.

Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787, 874 P.2d 595,598 (Ct. App. 1994)). The TEDRA Agreement itself
states,
If any dispute between or among the Parties concerning this Agreement hereto
results in litigation, the prevailing Party shall be reimbursed and indemnified by the
Party not prevailing for all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the prevailing
Party in enforcing or establishing his or her rights hereunder, including without
limitation court costs and reasonable attorney fees.

R. 81-82.
This proceeding obviously involves the TEDRA statutes, and the TEDRA Agreement itself
clearly provides that the prevailing party should be award reasonable attorney fees. As such, the
Court should affirm the District Court's award of attorney fees to Trustee De Young, and this Court
should also award attorney fees to Trustee De Young on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court should affirm the District Court's decision to grant
Trustee DeYoung's Motion to Dismiss and should grant attorney fees for this appeal to Trustee
DeYoung.

DATED this 11th day of August, 2017.

SCOT . NASS #4555
Attorney At Law, PLLC
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